Thereafter, Wilson's ghost haunted the 20th century : in the Second World War, in which 50 million people were killed; in the Cold War, with its nuclear fear and destructive "proxy" wars; and in the countless post- Cold War conflicts that threaten anarchy, death, and destruction.
We argue that fundamentally, the human race - in particular foreign and defense policy makers of the Great Powers - has not made the prevention of human carnage a central priority.
Beware of the temptation to believe that sustainable peace will be maintained simply by plotting to achieve an alleged "balance of power" without a strong international organization to enforce it.
For President Wilson had convinced many Americans that Armistice Day represented not merely the end of the most devastating war in world history, but also, in the phrase Wilson made famous, "the war to end all war".
"America," said Wilson, "is only the idealistic nation in the world."
Wilson failed the accomplish these objectives. In the end Germany was humiliated and embittered by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which required not only the ceding of vast tracts of land but also the payment of exorbitant reparations to Germany's European enemies. Wilson's League of Nations, moreover, was rendered nearly irrelevant by America's absence from it, due to Wilson's failure to persuade the U.S Senate to ratify the treaty creating it. During a cross-country speaking tour in the summer of 1919 on behalf of the treaty, Wilson suffered a stroke, from which he never recovered. The Senate would vote down the League shortly thereafter. Thus did his personal tragedy reflect that of his country and his world.
The Moral Imperative - establish as a major goal of the U.S foreign policy, and indeed of foreign policies across the globe the avoidance in this century of the carnage - 160million dead - caused by the conflict in the 20th century
The Multilateral Imperative - recognize that the United States must provide leadership to achieve the objective of reduced carnage but, in doing so, it will not apply its economic, political, or military power unilaterally, other than in the unlikely circumstances of a defense of the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska.
Wilson was accused of being a native Idealist
Yet the tragic history of the 20th century that followed strongly suggests that Lloyd George and the other Europeans - self-style "realists" - might with considerable profit have listened more closely to the "idealist" from America.
Wilson believed that until the power to make war was given over in large part to an international body such as the League, there could be no insurance against the kind of miscalculation, paranoia, suspicion, and error-ridden decision making that had led to the First World War.
And only by means of Article X would it become clear that seeking unilateral advantage at the expense of others would not be tolerated and would thus, Wilson believed, be significantly deterred.
Without Article X, he believed, nations and leaders were bound to waver in moments of crisis, when "the will to war is everything," as it had been during the July crisis of 1914. Thus, there mut be no unilateral application of military force by any member of the League of Nations against any other member, under penalty of a guaranteed and proportionate military response by the forces of some or all of the other members.
